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Abstract 
How do the Affordable Care Act health insurance coverage expansions affect 
payment for medical care provided through liability insurance, such as auto 
insurance? Theoretically, expanding coverage might lead to a substitution of 
health insurance disbursements for automobile insurance disbursements. 
Alternatively, expanding health insurance coverage might increase utilization of 
medical care, increasing auto liability claims payments.  The net effect of these 
two mechanisms can only be determined empirically.  We evaluate the health 
insurance-auto insurance interaction by examining the 2010 ACA dependent 
coverage expansion.  Prior to 2010, individuals 19 and older were excluded 
from health insurance coverage under their parental health insurance plan.  In 
September 2010, as part of the ACA, individuals were allowed to continue 
health insurance coverage until age 26.  We use this policy change and claims 
data from insurers representing approximately 60% of the automobile 
passenger market to evaluate the effects of expanding health insurance 
coverage on auto liability claim payments.  Using a difference-in-difference 
research design, we find an approximate 10% reduction in the total BI claim 
count in the policy-affected 19-25 ages when compared to the control group of 
individuals 26-34.  Conditional on filing a claim, we also find an approximate 9% 
reduction in the mean total auto insurance paid amount in the 19-25 ages 
compared to the 26-34 ages.  We do not identify any effects of the policy on the 
PIP auto insurance line. 
 
We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Casualty and Actuarial Society 
(CAS) and the RAND Institute for Civil Justice.  We thank the Insurance Research 
Council for providing assistance in understanding the closed claims data, and David 
Auerbach, Michael DeMattei, Glen Leibowitz, Anne Petrides, and participants in the 
2016 CAS Annual Meeting for providing helpful comments on this research.  All 
statements and conclusions in the paper are the sole responsibility of the authors and 
not the aforementioned individuals or institutions. 
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I. Introduction 
Prior to the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), approximately 85% 
of the adult population was insured.  Over the 2010 to 2015 time period, over 19 million 
individuals have gained access to health insurance, either via the 2010 ACA dependent 
coverage expansion, state and federal health insurance exchanges, or increases in 
coverage via Medicaid (Garrett and Gangopadhyaya, 2016).  The effects of the 
coverage expansions on the U.S. population and other participants in the health care 
system are likely to be substantial.  Increases in health insurance coverage will likely 
increase financial risk protection and health care utilization among enrollees, and lead 
to an increase in total reimbursements for physicians and hospitals. 
Although political debates over the ACA have focused primarily on its impacts on 
the health insurance market, it seems plausible that the ACA may have implications for 
many other insurance products because many other forms of insurance provide 
compensation for medical care.  In this paper, we assess whether health insurance 
expansions under the ACA affect claim payments made through the auto liability 
insurance system.  In 2007, several years prior to the implementation of the ACA, auto 
insurers paid for $35 billion in medical expenditures or two percent of U.S. health care 
costs, a figure comparable to disbursements in the medical malpractice liability system.  
As we describe in greater detail in the text, in some situations, health insurance may 
serve as a substitute for auto liability, in which case an increase in health insurance 
coverage potentially reduces auto insurers claim payments.  However, other forces may 
lead to coverage expansions increasing health care payments borne by auto insurers. 
We explore the relationship between the health and auto insurance markets by 
analyzing the effects of the 2010 ACA dependent coverage health insurance expansion 
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on auto liability claim patterns.  Prior evaluations of this policy change find that health 
insurance coverage increased by approximately 6 percentage points among those aged 
19-25 as compared to a control group of individuals 26 and older (Sommers et al. 
2013), a result we confirm in our own analysis of data from the American Community 
Survey (ACS).  Comparing samples of closed auto insurance claims from 2007 and 
2012 and a differences-in-difference research design, we show measurable reductions 
in medical damages and resultant claim payments among individuals ages 19-25 
compared to individuals ages 26 and above after the dependent coverage expansion.  
Supplementary analyses suggest that reductions in emergency room physician 
payments represent an important channel for the observed decrease in claim costs. 
The paper proceeds as follows: in section II, we describe the various 
mechanisms by which increases in health insurance coverage might affect auto 
insurance disbursements.  In section III, we replicate and expand on the existing 
empirical work regarding the effects of the ACA dependent coverage expansion on 
health insurance coverage among young adults.  In section IV, we describe the data 
and the empirical methodology used to estimate the effect of the ACA on auto claim 
frequency and severity.  In section V, we present our main results using data from the 
2007 and 2012 auto insurance claims databases, enrich our findings using physician 
and hospital utilization and charge data, and conduct several analyses aimed at testing 
the sensitivity of the initial results to alternative regression models and sample selection 
procedures.  We conclude with a discussion of the applicability of these results to the 
ACA health insurance expansions that began in early 2014. 
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II. Auto Insurance and Health Insurance 
Auto insurance in the United States generally covers not only vehicle damage, 
but also damages due to injury in a crash, such as medical treatment, lost wages, and 
payments for pain and suffering.  Liability insurance, the focus of this study, is the 
component of auto insurance that provides compensation for injuries and depending on 
the type of policy, can provide payments for both third-party (i.e. inflicted by the insured 
on others) or first-party (i.e. injuries of the insured, regardless of fault) damages.  In this 
paper, we focus on Bodily Injury (BI) and Personal Injury Protection (PIP) coverages, 
which account for the largest fraction of auto insurance medical payments.1  BI is the 
most common form of auto liability insurance, and is required in nearly all states.  It 
pays for damages, including medical care, that are the fault of the insured party.  PIP 
pays for medical care, lost wages, and selected other economic damages for the 
insured party regardless of fault, and is a required coverage in 12 states, including 
Florida and New York. 
There are several channels through which the health insurance status of an 
individual involved in an auto crash might influence the ultimate payments made by 
liability insurers.  For BI, if the injured individual does not have health insurance, they 
may have more incentive to press a bodily injury claim as a means of seeking recovery 
for medical expenses than if their costs were already covered through health insurance.  
Additionally, the presence or absence of health insurance may impact the rates at which 
                                                
1 The other main coverages are Underinsured/Uninsured Motorist (UM/UIM), which is a first-party 
coverage that functions like BI in the event that the responsible party in an accident failed to maintain 
adequate liability insurance, and Med Pay, which is an optional coverage offered in states without PIP 
that covers medical costs for the insured party.  Because a comparatively small proportion of accidents 
involve uninsured drivers, and because Med Pay policy limits tend to be low and Med Pay is only 
purchased by some drivers, these coverages are relatively less important as sources of payments for 
auto injuries. 
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providers accept payments for medical care, which can ultimately feed into the auto 
claim settlement amount.  Because health insurers often negotiate preferred 
reimbursement rates that are substantially below the rates charged to the uninsured, 
patients with health insurance may be allowed lower payment rates even when auto 
insurers ultimately bear the costs of treatment.2 
PIP coverage functions somewhat differently from BI, and therefore is not 
impacted in the same way by the health insurance coverage status of the insured.  PIP 
is a first-party coverage that makes payments regardless of fault, and is generally the 
primary payer in an injury situation.  Moreover, because PIP generally reimburses at 
much higher rates than health insurance, providers have strong incentives to seek 
reimbursement for PIP over health insurance.  For PIP, then, health insurance is less 
likely to act as a direct substitute for payments. 
For both PIP and BI, however, there are additional potential channels linking 
health insurance and claim payments.  When an individual does not have health 
insurance, auto insurance at the time of an accident may in some cases be used to 
provide reimbursement for pre-existing conditions unrelated to the accident.3  Informal 
conversations with auto insurance experts suggest such substitution is possible, 
although empirical studies that have evaluated the magnitudes of such substitutions are 
lacking.  Heath insurance expansions, to the extent that they permit individuals to 
                                                
2 One reason for this phenomenon is that liability payments depend on a determination of fault, and fault 
is not always clear at the time a patient presents for medical care.  Thus, in many cases providers will 
initially accept a patient under the supposition that their care will be covered through their health 
insurance, and auto insurance may not step in until after the care has been received and billed.  In such 
cases health insurers can recover their expenses through a process called subrogation, which we do not 
explore here. 
3 An example might be an uninsured individual with chronic back pain who is involved in an auto accident 
and then receives chiropractic treatment. 
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address pre-existing health issues through their new insurance, might decrease future 
auto liability payments. 
A second possible sub-mechanism, involves treatment increases due to better 
insurance coverage.  Doyle (2005) finds that auto accident victims who had health 
insurance received approximately 20% more treatment than auto accident victims who 
did not have health insurance.  If physicians provide more treatment to insured 
individuals, it’s possible that some portion of these additional treatment costs will be 
passed on to auto insurers. 
The above discussion identifies potential mechanisms through which coverage 
expansions might both increase and decrease auto claim frequency and or severity.  
There are plausible reasons to expect that BI might be more dramatically impacted than 
PIP, but ultimately the extent and direction of any impacts is an empirical question.  We 
turn next to addressing that question, focusing on a large coverage expansion that 
offers a credible means of separating the effects of health insurance from other 
confounding factors that determine claim frequency and severity. 
 
III. The ACA Dependent Coverage Expansion 
One of the first provisions of the Affordable Care Act to take effect was an 
expansion of health insurance coverage for young adults up to 26 years of age whose 
parents have employer-sponsored or individual health insurance. 4   This provision 
applied to all new health insurance contracts starting on or after September 23, 2010—
as of that date, adult children, regardless of residence, student status, or marital status, 
                                                
4 This provision was not subject to meaningful court challenges and thus there was little uncertainty 
regarding implementation. 
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became eligible for insurance under their parents’ health plan (U.S. Department of 
Labor, 2013).  This eligibility under their parents’ health plan was extended to young 
adults regardless of whether they were eligible for insurance through another employer 
or through a state health exchange.  Prior to the dependent coverage expansion, young 
adults were the age group least likely to be covered by health insurance  (Collins, 
Robertson, Garber, & Doty, 2013) and had the lowest level of access to employment-
based insurance (U.S. Department of Labor, 2013).5 
Prior research concludes that the 2010 ACA measure increased health insurance 
coverage among young adults.  Data from the 2010 and 2011 National Health 
Insurance Surveys revealed a 5.5 percentage point increase in health insurance 
coverage for the 19-25 age group and no change in health insurance coverage for the 
26-34 age group (Sommers et al. 2013).  Before using auto insurance claims data to 
understand the effects of the coverage expansions on auto insurance disbursements, 
we first replicate these initial results using data from the 2008 and 2013 American 
Community Survey (ACS).  The ACS data is available yearly from the United States and 
to our knowledge, contains the largest samples from which to examine health insurance 
trends in the United States 6 .  The ACS data began to collect health insurance 
information starting in 2008, so we use the 5-year 2008-2013 data window to replicate 
prior analyses.  Figure I presents the share of individuals who are covered by health 
insurance by single year of age in the pre (2008) and post (2013) ACA dependent 
                                                
5 Some states had implemented similar coverage expansions prior to the ACA.  Monheit et al. (2011) 
provides a more detailed discussion. 
6 The Behavioral Risk Factor Social Survey (BRFSS) data is another possible data source to analyze 
health insurance trends in the United States and has been used previously by researchers to understand 
the effects of the dependent coverage expansion.  The sample sizes in the ACS data are substantially 
larger than the sample sizes in the BRFSS data. 
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coverage expansion time periods.7  Figure I shows a notable increase in the share of 
individuals covered by health insurance (approximately 5 percentage points) in the 
under 26 population over the 2008 to 2013 time period.  Health insurance coverage for 
individuals aged 26 and over is nearly identical in the pre and post policy years.  
Consistent with prior findings, in a difference-in-difference regression framework, we 
find that health insurance coverage increased by 5.7 percentage points in the under 26 
ages across the pre and post policy time periods.  Using the share of individuals 
covered by health insurance in the 19-25 age group in 2008 as the base (69%), the 
estimated change in coverage translates to an 8.3% increase in the health insurance 
coverage for the 19-25 age group. 
 
IV. Data and Empirical Methods 
Our primary data sources are the auto insurance closed claims databases from 2007 
and 2012 produced by the Insurance Research Council (IRC).  In each year, the IRC 
samples claims from U.S. auto insurers who collectively represent approximately 60 
percent of the US private passenger auto insurance market.  Participating insurers 
abstract all paid claims closed within a pre-determined time window (typically around 
two weeks) using a common abstraction procedure developed by the IRC.  Although it 
is possible that these data are not perfectly representative of the overall auto insurance 
market, due both to non-participation by some insurers and possible seasonality in 
claims, the IRC data are widely viewed as the best source of auto claims micro-data 
spanning multiple companies.  Moreover, there is little reason to suspect that any non-
                                                
7 The public use ACS data does not reveal information about the date of interview.  Since the ACA 
dependent coverage policy went into effect in October, the error due to misclassification should be minor 
and lead to conservative estimates of health insurance effects. 
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representativeness that might arise due to the IRC’s sampling procedures would 
differentially affect claims involving people of particular ages.  The databases contain 
information on all auto liability coverages, but we focus our analysis on BI and PIP. 
The IRC auto claims data contains information on the age of the claimant, 
whether the accident was covered under PIP or BI, the accident year, and, when 
available, medical damages (in dollars) filed by the claimant and any outlays from the 
insurers8.  The data also contains detailed information on claimant demographics, 
accident characteristics, injury severity (including the type of injury and the body part 
that was injured), and the types and amounts of medical care received.  All records 
include the total amount paid to settle the claim; for those claims where the insurer has 
partitioned the payments into components for medical care, other economic losses, pain 
and suffering, etc., the amounts of these payments are also recorded. 
 
 
Empirical Methods 
We conduct two sets of analyses with the claims data, and estimate our models 
separately for BI and PIP.  In the first set of analyses, we examine claim counts by age, 
our measure of claim frequency, to test whether the coverage expansion affected the 
auto liability claim volume.  More specifically, using a differences-in-difference 
approach, we test to see if the total number of claims in the under 26 ages compared to 
the over 26 group increased or decreased following the policy change.  In the second 
set of analyses, the severity analyses, we test whether the policy change affected the 
                                                
8 When filing a claim, most but not all claimants allocate damages to different categories—e.g. damages 
for medical services, lost wages, etc. 
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reported damages and payment amounts—our measures of claim severity--in the under 
26 group when compared to the over 26 group across the two time periods.  We 
conduct the total claims analyses using Poisson regression analyses of counts 
measured at the state, age, and year level of observation, weighting the cells by stage-
year-age population obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau population.  For the 
analyses involving the claimed damage and actual disbursement amounts, we conduct 
the analyses at the individual claim level.  For these latter analyses, we utilize ordinary 
least squares, after taking logs of the dependent variables to minimize the effects of 
outliers. 
We use the following regression specification to identify the effect of the policy 
change on BI and PIP claim counts and severity: 
 
𝑌! =  𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽!𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟_26 + 𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦    +  𝛽!(𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟_26 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦)    + 𝜸𝒁𝒊 + 𝜀! 
 
In the regression equation Under_26 is a dummy variable for whether the observation is 
from the 25 and under ages, Post_Policy is a dummy variable for whether the 
observation is from a year in which the ACA dependent coverage expansion is in effect 
and 𝒁𝒊 is a vector of additional covariates that always includes state, year, and state-
year interactions.  The 𝛽! coefficient captures the main coefficient of interest, the 
percentage change (100*(exp(𝛽!) - 1) in the treated group (ages under 26) as compared 
to the percentage change in auto disbursements in the control group (ages 26 and 
over). 
As stated, the dependent 𝑌! variables here include claim counts, damages and 
paid amounts.  In some specifications, we separately consider medical damages and 
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medical payments as distinct from total damages and total payments.  The medical 
damage amount captures the claimant’s reported outlays for medical care.  The medical 
paid amount captures the portion of the overall payment allocated by the insurer to 
compensate for medical payments, and the total paid amount captures the total 
payment from the auto insurer, including medical, lost wages, and other damages.9 
In the simplest regression specification for equation (1), we include dummy 
variables for age, year-fixed effects, state-fixed effects, state-year fixed effects, and an 
interaction term between the post policy dummy variable and the dummy variable for 
being in the treated age group.  The year-fixed effects account for macroeconomic and 
technological change that affects all states and age groups, while the state/year 
interactions account flexibly for unobserved state-level factors—for example, changes to 
state tort law or traffic laws—that affect individuals of all ages.  We also test the 
sensitivity of these estimates to any potential differential time trends across the two age 
groups in the outcomes.  If the outcomes are trending differentially across the two age 
groups due to uncontrolled factors, failing to account for differential trends will bias the 
main coefficient of interest. 
The auto insurance data collects information on more than 20 types of injuries, 
injury severity, information on whether the accident led to a disability and the severity of 
the impact.  In addition to adjusting for accident and injury severity, we also examine 
regression models that adjust for any other claimant or policy related characteristics that 
might have an effect on the reported damages and amount of payment.  These include 
                                                
9 Although the medical paid amount ideally captures the insurer disbursement for medical 
expenses, in approximately 25% of the claims insurers do not report the medical paid amount.  
In these cases, the insurer likely did not apportion liability uniquely among medical, lost wages 
and other categories of losses. 
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information on the sex of the claimant, the location of the claimant, whether the claimant 
is employed, the number of vehicles involved in the accident, determination of fault and 
insurance policy limits.  Finally, for the claim counts analyses, using data from the 
American Community Survey, we also test the sensitivity of the main estimates to the 
inclusion of controls capturing any differential changes in education, employment, 
average wages, marital status and vehicle ownership among the state, age and time 
cells.  Since regressions with state and state-time interactions are data intensive, we 
first examine results using the larger age windows considered previously in the 
literature, 19-34.  We then test the sensitivity of these estimates to using a narrower age 
band of ages 23-28 (Barbesco, Courtemanche and Qi 2014). 
 
Results  
Graphical Analyses 
We begin with graphical analyses of changes in total BI and PIP claim counts, 
medical damages and medical paid amounts over the 2007 to 2012 time period.  
Figures II and III plot percentage changes in total claims over the 2007 and 2012 time 
period for BI and PIP coverage lines by age of the claimant.  Figures IV-VI plot changes 
in mean (per claim) BI medical damage, BI medical paid, and BI total paid amounts over 
the 2007 and 2012 data years.  Figures VII-IX replicate the same figures using data 
from the PIP coverage line.  Because of changes in the sampling scheme and price 
inflation, we would not expect claim volume or payment amounts to be constant across 
years; however, the figures reveal the extent to which the age groups specifically 
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targeted by the ACA young adult expansion appear to experience different trajectories 
in outcomes as compared to similar, unaffected ages. 
An examination of the data from Figures II-VII reveals several interesting 
findings.  First, the percent change in BI claims, and the percent changes in mean BI 
medical damages and mean BI medical paid amounts, are consistently smaller in the 
19-25 ages over the 2007 to 2012 time period when compared to the 26-34 ages.  Most 
striking, the claim counts per age within the 19-25 age group decreased by 7.8% 
compared to a 6.6% increase in the 26-34 ages.  Conditional on submitting a claim, the 
mean BI medical damage amount in the 19-25 ages increased on average by 7.6%; this 
compares to a 28.5% average increase in the BI medical damage amount in the 26-34 
ages.  Similarly, conditional on submitting a claim, the mean BI medical paid amount in 
the 19-25 ages increased on average by 4.3%.  This compares to an average 11.6% 
increase in the medical damage amount in the 26-34 ages.  The unadjusted changes in 
BI total paid amounts in the 19-25 group are also generally smaller when compared to 
the changes in the 26-34 ages, except for an outlier value at age 24. 
Also noticeable directly from the figures, the differences in claim counts, 
damages, and payments among the groups with expanded health insurance coverage 
are observable even when narrowing attention to those aged 23-28.  For example, 
limiting the sample to just the 23-25 ages indicates an average 9.2% decrease in claim 
counts over the 2007-2012 time period, compared to no change in the 26-28 ages. 
Compared to BI, we observe different patterns in PIP closed claim counts across 
the two age groups over the 2007-2012 time period.  For PIP coverage, we do not 
observe any differential changes in claim counts across the 19-25 vs. the 26-34 ages.  
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Although there is a noticeable drop in claim counts over the two time periods, this drop 
occurs in near equal amounts in both age groups.  Unadjusted mean PIP medical 
damages and medical paid amounts exhibit similar age-time patterns as the BI medical 
damages and BI medical paid amounts.  Taking the PIP medical damage amount as an 
example, we calculate an average 13% increase within the 19-25 ages over the 2007 to 
2012 time period.  This compares to an average 47% increase in the 26-34 ages. 
 
Regression Results 
Bodily Injury Results 
In Tables I-III, using equation 1, via regression analyses, we examine the effects 
of the policy change on the total number of BI and PIP claims (Table I), BI medical 
damages, BI medical paid and BI total paid amounts (Table II), and PIP medical 
damages, PIP medical paid and PIP total paid amounts (Table III).  In each of these 
tables, column one contains results for our primary coefficient of interest from the 
simplest regression specification.  In the remaining columns, we report the primary 
coefficient of interest from regression models where we add the injury severity, 
demographic and auto insurance policy covariates as controls. 
For BI, we find moderate effects of the dependent coverage expansion on total 
closed claims (Table I), and total paid amounts (Tables II). For the BI total claims 
analyses (Table I, column I), we find an 11.8%10 reduction in total claims in the under 25 
group compared to the over 25 group, and this effect is statistically significant at the 1% 
                                                
10 As described in the methods section all of the coefficients reported in the tables must be evaluated 
using the following formula, (100*(exp(𝛽) - 1) to be understood as percentage changes. In this instance, 
using the coefficient in Table I (-.126) and evaluating using the reported formula, results in a value of 
11.8%. 
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level.  Adjusting for state-year level education, employment, wage and marital status 
covariates only marginally reduces the estimated effect to 10.1% (Table I column II). 
Table II shows similar effects of the policy change on measures of claim severity, 
particularly the total payment, which is reported for all closed auto insurance claims.  In 
the simplest specification, (Table II, column 1), we find an approximate seven percent 
reduction in total disbursement in the 19-25 group compared to the 26-34 age group 
and this estimate is statistically significant at the 10% level.  Adjusting for the injury and 
accident severity variables increases this estimate slightly to 8.6%11 and this estimate is 
statistically significant at the five percent level.  Adding additional controls related to 
claimant and policy characteristics only marginally affects this coefficient and has no 
effect on statistical significance.  For the medical damages and medical paid amount 
analyses, we do not identify any strong effects of the policy change.  Although we 
consistently find negative effects for the 19-25 age group with respect to medical 
damages, none of the coefficients are statistically significant at the five or 10% level. 
It is important to recognize that because it is conducted at the level of the 
individual claim, the above analysis of claim severity incorporates two effects—a 
selection effect arising due to a change in the pool of claims observed within the liability 
system as a result of the reform, plus any direct effect of the reform on claim severity.  A 
direct effect might occur if, for example, collateral sources of payment are taken into 
account in calculating a personal injury award, so that the presence of payments from a 
health insurer partially offsets payments that pre-reform would have been made by the 
                                                
11In this instance using the coefficient reported in Table II column II (-.090), and evaluating using the 
reported formula, (100*(exp(𝛽) - 1), results in a value of 8.6%. 
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BI insurer.  The results in the tables do not enable us to cleanly separate out these two 
effects. 
One seemingly plausible scenario that does not seem particularly consistent with 
these results, however, is one in which gaining health insurance has no direct effect on 
claim severity, but does result in a shifting of lower severity, and conceivably more 
“elective” claims out of the liability system and into the health insurance system.  Under 
such a scenario, we would expect claims of lower than average value to disappear from 
the sample post-reform, in which case the average damage amount or payment would 
rise.  The results here appear to contradict such a scenario. 
 
PIP Results 
Next, we examine the effects of the dependent coverage expansion on the PIP 
auto insurance line.  As noted previously, unlike BI, we do not expect health insurance 
coverage and PIP coverage to interact in a significant way and therefore expect effects 
for PIP coverage that are below any BI effects. 
In Table I we replicate the regression models for PIP claim counts, and in Table 
III we replicate the regression models for the PIP medical damage amount, the PIP 
medical paid amount, and the PIP total paid amount variables.  Unlike for BI, we do not 
find any differential decreases in PIP claim counts for the 19-25 ages compared to the 
26-34 ages.  In the simplest analyses, we estimate a near zero effect of the policy 
change on PIP claim volume (coefficient of .006). Adding covariates to the regression 
model results in a positive coefficient, but this coefficient is not statistically significant 
even at the 10% level.  With respect to the medical damage, medical paid and total paid 
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variables (Table III), we consistently find much smaller point estimates for PIP damages 
and PIP disbursements when compared to BI and in none of the cases are the 
estimates statistically significant at the five or even the 10% level. 
 
Robustness Checks 
In the initial analyses, to maximize the sample size, we used data from the larger age-
window to understand the effects of the coverage expansion.  Increasing the sample 
size in this manner could in theory, bias the main coefficients of interest as individuals 
who are farther away in age do not provide a good counterfactual for the claims 
experience of young adults affected by the ACA.  We tested the sensitivity of the BI 
estimates to the age window selection criteria by re-estimating the claim count, the 
medical damages, medical paid and total paid regression models but now only using the 
23-28 ages in the analyses (Tables IV-V).  In the narrower age analyses, we continue to 
find that the dependent coverage expansion reduced claim counts (Table IV) and total 
paid amounts (Table V) for the 23-25 group compared to the 26-28 age group.  For BI, 
in the smaller age bandwidth, we continue to find an approximate 11% reduction in total 
claims and this estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level12.  We also continue to 
see reductions in total per-claim reimbursement in the policy affected age groups.  In 
the regression specification that includes controls for accident severity, injury severity, 
claimant and policy characteristics we find an approximate 15% reduction in the total 
paid amount for the 19-25 group compared to the 26-34 age group; this coefficient is 
                                                
12 Cameron, Miller and Gelbach (2008) find that in analyses with a small number of clusters (~ < 10) 
clustering on age leads to standard errors that are too small.  They suggest using a larger rejection 
threshold based on clusters-2 degrees of freedom.  We use this larger threshold (T statisticl>2.78) for 
rejecting the null hypothesis for the analyses that limit the samples to the 23-28 ages. 
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statistically significant at the 5% level.  Similar to the larger age group analyses we 
again, consistently find negative coefficients for the medical damages and medical paid 
variables, but statistical significance is only reached typically at the 10% level.  Overall, 
in a comparison of these estimates to estimates from Tables I and II, we consistently 
find similar or larger point estimates for the main coefficients of interest in the BI auto 
insurance line.  Finally, in Tables IV and VI, we replicated all of the prior PIP analyses 
for the narrower ages.  Consistent with the larger age group analyses, we do not see 
any effects of the policy change on PIP claim counts or on per-claim-reimbursement in 
the PIP auto-insurance line. 
 
Understanding the Estimated BI Effects  
We explore the initial results regarding BI total paid amounts by analyzing the detailed 
medical charge information included in the auto insurance claims data.  The available 
charge information is broken down by the type of physician (anesthesiologist, 
chiropractor, etc.) that provided care, care setting (hospital, outpatient, ER) and the 
types of tests (MRIs, cat-scans etc.) received by the claimant.  From the large set of 
available variables, we examined the effects of the policy change on mean hospital 
charges, three physician charge variables (emergency physician charges, general 
practitioner charges, chiropractor charges) and charges for X-rays.  We chose these 
particular variables since hospital reimbursement is a substantial part of total medical 
spending and because a large number of claims reported the charge amounts for these 
variables. 
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Table IX presents the results for these analyses, for the two age bandwidths (19-
34 and 23-38) for regressions where we include the full set of covariates.  We do not 
find any statistically significant changes of the policy on hospital charges or charges for 
expensive tests, but we do find some suggestive evidence of effects of the policy 
change on physician charges, particularly ER physician charges.  Estimates from the 
regression models indicate a 17% reduction in ER physician charges in the 23-25 group 
compared to the 26-28 age group. 
 
Discussion 
How are health insurance and auto insurance markets related?  We tested for 
the interdependencies of these two markets via an examination of the effects of the 
ACA dependent coverage expansion on auto insurance disbursements in the BI and 
PIP coverage lines.  We find that increases in health insurance coverage reduce BI total 
closed claims and reduce BI total paid amounts, but do not have effects on the PIP 
coverage line.  BI auto insurance claims frequency was reduced by approximately 10% 
and the mean total liability payment fell by approximately nine percent among young 
adults exposed to the coverage expansion.  Results for BI claim counts and BI total paid 
amounts are also robust to adjustments that limit the sample to a narrower age band 
(23-28).  We do not find any effects of the 2010 dependent coverage expansion on any 
of the PIP auto insurance variables (claim counts, medical damages, medical paid and 
total paid amounts). 
What explains the effects identified in this paper? An examination of a 
breakdown of charges related to different health care services suggests that changes in 
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ER physician expenditures contribute significantly to understanding the BI total paid 
results. Furthermore, as noted previously auto insurers are also more likely to pay list 
prices (charges) compared to traditional health insurers.  Thus, any substitution away 
overall, or substitution away particularly from within an expensive product line, from auto 
insurers to health insurers would result in substantial reductions in auto insurance 
disbursements. 
Since the implementation of the ACA dependent coverage expansion, several 
other ACA-related health insurance expansions have been implemented, most notably 
Medicaid expansions; expansions via the private health insurance exchanges.  These 
expansions are significantly larger than the dependent coverage expansion since they 
are aimed at more than just the 19-25 ages and are supported both by a relaxation of 
Medicaid eligibility rules as well as significant subsidies for the purchase of private 
health insurance.  What are the implications of the results presented in this paper for the 
more recent health insurance expansions? 
If the parameter estimates identified in the above analyses apply to the insurance 
expansions in the older ages then we would predict substantial reductions in BI auto 
insurance disbursements in the market as a whole.  The extent to which these 
parameter estimates are applicable to a broader set of age groups, though, is unknown. 
For example, according a 2008 report by the National Research Council, Institute of 
Medicine and Transportation Research Board, young adults are at the highest risk of 
serious morbidity from auto accidents (NRC, IOM, TRB, 2007).  The prevalence of 
higher morbidity rates in this age group, and thus the necessity of medical care during 
the treatment and recovery process, means it is possible that the parameter estimates 
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from Tables II-III, which are applicable to a much larger set of people, are potentially 
upper bounds. 
Additionally, the generosity of health insurance provided through the other 
coverage expansion components of the ACA is likely to differ from that of the young 
adult expansion.  The young adult expansion increased eligibility for existing parental 
coverage, meaning that the newly insured primarily gained access to employer-
sponsored private health insurance.  The ACA Medicaid expansions offered public 
insurance to some uninsured, but typically featured narrower access to physicians and 
lower provider reimbursements for services than private health insurance.  The 
exchange-based plans, in contrast, are private plans with fairly generous provider 
reimbursements, but with higher copays or more limited networks to constrain costs.  
The varying levels of access and generosity across these different types of health 
insurance create claiming incentives for patients and providers that may differ from 
those produced by the young adult expansion.  Thus, while these estimates are 
important in providing some of the first rigorous evidence of a spillover effect from 
health insurance markets to auto liability insurance, their applicability to the full suite of 
ACA-related coverage expansions remains uncertain. 
 
Conclusion 
How are health insurance and auto insurance markets related?  To our 
knowledge, this is one of the first studies to examine the effects of health insurance on 
auto liability payments.  Exploiting a health coverage reform (the ACA young adult 
expansion) that expanded health insurance among an identifiable population in a 
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manner unlikely to be related to their underlying propensity to be injured in auto 
crashes, we show that an increase in health insurance coverage generates measurable 
reductions in the total number of BI claims and average BI payments.  Analyses from 
charge data suggest that a reduction in ER physician spending is a potentially important 
contributor to the decline in claim severity.  We observe no measurable impact of health 
coverage expansion on the total number of PIP claims or severity.  Future work should 
explore the effects of the more recent, larger, ACA health insurance expansions on auto 
insurance markets. 
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Figure I: Health Insurance Coverage in 2008 and 2013, by Age 
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Figure II: Percent Change in BI Claim Counts from 2007 to 2012, by Claimant Age 
  
 
 
 
Figure III: Percent Change in PIP Claim Counts from 2017 to 2012, by Claimant 
Age  
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Figure IV: Percent Change in the Mean BI Medical Damage Amount (per Closed 
Claim) from 2007 to 2012, by Claimant Age 
   
 
 
 
Figure V:  Percent Change in the Mean BI Medical Paid Amount (per Closed 
Claim) from 2007 to 2012, by Claimant Age 
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Figure VI: Percent Change in the Mean BI Total Paid Amount (per Closed Claim) 
from 2007 to 2012, by Claimant Age 
   
 
 
 
Figure VII: Percent Change in the Mean PIP Medical Damage Amount (per Closed 
Claim) from 2007 to 2012, by Claimant Age  
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Figure VIII:  Percent Change in the Mean PIP Medical Paid Amount (per Closed 
Claim) from 2007 to 2012, by Claimant Age 
  
 
 
 
Figure IX: Percent Change in the Mean PIP Total Paid Amount (per Closed Claim) 
from 2007 to 2012, by Claimant Age 
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Treated	Age	Group	*	Post_Policy
Age,	Time,	State	and	State	Time	Fixed	Effects
Demographic	Controls
N
	 	 	 	
Notes:	***Statistically	significant	at	<=1%.	**	Statistically	significant	at	<=5%
*Statistically	significant	at	<=	10%	level.	Estimates	are	from	Poisson	regression	
models.	Standard	errors	are	in	parantheses	and	clustered	on	age.	Demographic
controls	include	adjustments	for	education,	employment,	average	wages,
number	of	vehicles	and	marital	status.
Table	I:	BI	and	PIP	Claims	Count	Analyses	(Ages	19-34)
Treated	Age	Group	*	Post_Policy
PIP	Claims	Count PIP	Claims	Count
.006
(.079)
.072
(.085)
Yes
No
1632
Yes
(1) (2)
BI	Claims	Count BI	Claims	Count
(2)(1)
-.126***
(.036)
-.107**
(.036)
Yes
1632
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Treated	Age	Group	*	Post_Policy
	
N
	
Treated	Age	Group	*	Post_Policy
N
	
Treated	Age	Group	*	Post_Policy
N
Age,	Time,	State	and	State	Time	Fixed	Effects
Injury	and	Accident	Severity	Controls
Claimant	and	Policy	Controls
	 	 	 	 	
Notes:	***Statistically	significant	at	<=1%.	**	Statistically	significant	at	<=5%	*Statistically	significant
at	<=10%.		Estimates	are	from	OLS	regression	models	with	LN(Y)	as	the	dependent	variable.	Standard	errors	
are	in	parantheses	and	clustered	on	age.		All	regression	models	include	dummy	variables	for	age,	accident	year,	
accident	state	and	accident	state*accident	year	interactions.	Injury	controls	include	a	full	set	of	dummy	variables
for	all	injuries	reported	in	the	data	and	dummy	variables	for	injury	severity,	impact	severity	and	disability	status.	
Claimant	and	policy	characteristic	control	variables	include	dummy	varibles	for	claimant	sex,	claimant	location,
employee	work	status,	policy	limits,	determination	of	fault,	and	the	number	of	vehicles	involved	in	the	accident.	
Table	II:	BI	Medical	Damage,	Medical	Paid	and	Total	Paid	Amounts	(Ages	19-34)
Medical	Damage Medical	Damage Medical	Damage
-.047
(.061)
-.062
(.055)
-.06
(.05)
(1) (2)
Medical	Paid
(3)
7903 7903
Total	Paid Total	Paid Total	Paid
.008
(.066)
-.016
(.054)
-.014
(.053)
9106 9106 9106
Yes
Yes
Yes
(1) (2) (3)
(1) (2) (3)
Medical	Paid Medical	Paid
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
-.072*
(.038)
-0.090**
(.037)
-0.093**
(.036)
10539 10539 10539
7903
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Treated	Age	Group	*	Post_Policy
N
Treated	Age	Group	*	Post_Policy
N
Treated	Age	Group	*	Post_Policy
N
Age,	Time,	State	and	State	Time	Fixed	Effects
Injury	and	Accident	Severity	Controls
Claimant	and	Policy	Controls
	 	 	 	 	
Notes:	***Statistically	significant	at	<=1%.	**	Statistically	significant	at	<=5%	*Statistically	significant
at	<=10%.		Estimates	are	from	OLS	regression	models	with	LN(Y)	as	the	dependent	variable.	Standard	errors	
are	in	parantheses	and	clustered	on	age.		All	regression	models	include	dummy	variables	for	age,	accident	year,	
accident	state	and	accident	state*accident	year	interactions.	Injury	controls	include	a	full	set	of	dummy	variables
for	all	injuries	reported	in	the	data	and	dummy	variables	for	injury	severity,	impact	severity	and	disability	status.	
Claimant	and	policy	characteristic	control	variables	include	dummy	varibles	for	claimant	sex,	claimant	location,
employee	work	status,	policy	limits,	determination	of	fault,	and	the	number	of	vehicles	involved	in	the	accident.	
Table	III:	PIP	Medical	Damage,	Medical	Paid	and	Total	Paid	Amounts	(Ages	19-34)
Medical	Damage Medical	Damage Medical	Damage
3487 3487 3487
Medical	Paid Medical	Paid Medical	Paid
3575 3575 3575
-.035
(.134)
-.005
(.113)
-.007
(.112)
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
3435 3435 3435
Total	Paid Total	Paid Total	Paid
(1) (2) (3)
-.029
(.13)
-.011
(.110)
-.013
(.109)
Yes
(1) (2) (3)
(1) (2) (3)
-.036
(.122)
.001
(.096)
-.006
(.096)
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Treated	Age	Group	*	Post_Policy
Age,	Time,	State	and	State	Time	Fixed	Effects
Demographic	Controls
N
	 	 	 	
Notes:	***Statistically	significant	at	<=1%.	**	Statistically	significant	at	<=5%
*Statistically	significant	at	<=	10%	level.	Estimates	are	from	Poisson	regression	
models.	Standard	errors	are	in	parantheses	and	clustered	on	age.	Demographic
controls	include	adjustments	for	education,	employment,	average	wages,
number	of	vehicles	and	marital	status.
Yes
No
612
Yes
Yes
612
.15
(.11)
.17
(.13)
(1) (2)
(1) (2)
PIP	Claims	Count PIP	Claims	Count
Table	IV:	BI	and	PIP	Claims	Count	Analyses	(Ages	23-28)
Treated	Age	Group	*	Post_Policy -.115***
(.026)
-.100***
(.025)
BI	Claims	Count BI	Claims	Count
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Treated	Age	Group	*	Post_Policy
N
	
Treated	Age	Group	*Post_Policy
N
	 	
Treated	Age	Group	*	Post_Policy
N
Age,	Time,	State	and	State	Time	Fixed	Effects
Injury	and	Accident	Severity	Controls
Claimant	and	Policy	Controls
	 	 	 	 	
Notes:	***Statistically	significant	at	<=1%.	**	Statistically	significant	at	<=5%	*Statistically	significant
at	<=10%.		Estimates	are	from	OLS	regression	models	with	LN(Y)	as	the	dependent	variable.	Standard	errors	
are	in	parantheses	and	clustered	on	age.		All	regression	models	include	dummy	variables	for	age,	accident	year,	
accident	state	and	accident	state*accident	year	interactions.	Injury	controls	include	a	full	set	of	dummy	variables
for	all	injuries	reported	in	the	data	and	dummy	variables	for	injury	severity,	impact	severity	and	disability	status.	
Claimant	and	policy	characteristic	control	variables	include	dummy	varibles	for	claimant	sex,	claimant	location,
employee	work	status,	policy	limits,	determination	of	fault,	and	the	number	of	vehicles	involved	in	the	accident.	
Table	V:	BI	Medical	Damage,	Medical	Paid	and	Total	Paid	Amounts	(Ages	23-28)
-.129
(.068)
-.15**
(.048)
-.137*
(.051)
Yes
Yes
Yes
4080 4080 4080
Yes
No
-.137
(.066)
-.13*
(.053)
-.119
(.056)
-.116
(.069)
-0.158**
(.050)
-0.162**
(.050)
(1) (2) (3)
Total	Paid Total	Paid Total	Paid
3088 3088 3088
Medical	Damage Medical	Damage Medical	Damage
Medical	Paid Medical	Paid Medical	Paid
3552 3552 3552
(1) (2) (3)
(1) (2) (3)
No
Yes
Yes
No
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Treated	Age	Group	*	Post_Policy
N
Treated	Age	Group	*	Post_Policy
N
Treated	Age	Group	*	Post_Policy
N
Age,	Time,	State	and	State	Time	Fixed	Effects
Injury	and	Accident	Severity	Controls
Claimant	and	Policy	Controls
	 	 	 	 	
Notes:	***Statistically	significant	at	<=1%.	**	Statistically	significant	at	<=5%	*Statistically	significant
at	<=10%.		Estimates	are	from	OLS	regression	models	with	LN(Y)	as	the	dependent	variable.	Standard	errors	
are	in	parantheses	and	clustered	on	age.		All	regression	models	include	dummy	variables	for	age,	accident	year,	
accident	state	and	accident	state*accident	year	interactions.	Injury	controls	include	a	full	set	of	dummy	variables
for	all	injuries	reported	in	the	data	and	dummy	variables	for	injury	severity,	impact	severity	and	disability	status.	
Claimant	and	policy	characteristic	control	variables	include	dummy	varibles	for	claimant	sex,	claimant	location,
employee	work	status,	policy	limits,	determination	of	fault,	and	the	number	of	vehicles	involved	in	the	accident.	
Table	VI:	PIP	Medical	Damage,	Medical	Paid	and	Total	Paid	Amounts	(Ages	23-28)
-.09
(.16)
-.013
(.125)
.031
(.137)
-.057
(.186)
-.015
(.136)
.024
(.149)
(2) (3)
-.117
(.193)
-.065
(.151)
-.036
(.172)
Medical	Damage Medical	Damage Medical	Damage
1307 1307 1307
1285 1285 1285
(1) (2) (3)
(1)
1338 1338 1338
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
(1) (2) (3)
Medical	Paid Medical	Paid Medical	Paid
Total	Paid Total	Paid Total	Paid
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Ages	19-34
Treated	Age	Group	*	Post_Policy
N
AGES	23-28
Treated	Age	Group	*	Post_Policy
N
Age,	Time,	State	and	State	Time	Fixed	Effects
Injury	and	Accident	Severity	Controls
Claimant	and	Policy	Controls
	 	
Notes:	***Statistically	significant	at	<=1%.	**	Statistically	significant	at	<=5%	*Statistically	significant
at	<=10%.		Estimates	are	from	OLS	regression	models	with	LN(Y)	as	the	dependent	variable.	Standard	errors	
are	in	parantheses	and	clustered	on	age.		All	regression	models	include	dummy	variables	for	age,	accident	year,	
accident	state	and	accident	state*accident	year	interactions.	Injury	controls	include	a	full	set	of	dummy	variables
for	all	injuries	reported	in	the	data	and	dummy	variables	for	injury	severity,	impact	severity	and	disability	status.	
Claimant	and	policy	characteristic	control	variables	include	dummy	varibles	for	claimant	sex,	claimant	location,
employee	work	status,	policy	limits,	determination	of	fault,	and	the	number	of	vehicles	involved	in	the	accident.	
Table	VII:	BI	Charges	Analyses	(Ages	19-34	and	Ages	23-28)
.007
(.063)
-.098
(.067)
-.034
(.064)
-.06
(.10)
-.016
(..084)
1977 1408 1452 899 1586
4120
-.049
(.032)
-.186***
(.067)
-.184
(.093)
-.27
(.20)
0.11
(.09)
X-ray	Charges
5047
Hospital	Charges
3634 3654 2396
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Hospital	Charges ER	Physician	Charges Chiropractor	Charges GP	Charges X-ray	Charges
Yes
Yes
Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ER	Physician	Charges Chiropractor	Charges GP	Charges
Yes
Yes
Yes
